The EPRDF cannot abide by the constitution. It is not in their best interest. They also cannot allow truly free and fair elections in Ethiopia. The reason: "They don't want to end up on the ash heap of history." Remember what happened to the Democratic Party in the Nov 1994 congressional elections? In one night the Democrats lost control of congress by huge margins. A branch of government that they had controlled for over 70 years. 70 years! They also lost a majority of the governerships in the country. It was by far the biggest political shock that I have ever experienced. In my humble opinion I think Meles and all Ethiopians would have experienced the same shock last May had we had election observers monitoring every or nearly every polling station in the country. This would involve not only monitoring the voting process but more importantly the vote counting process. Absolute transparency in the voting process. I know this would have been a herculean task but a very necessary one since, historically, in Ethiopia we have not had a single leader who has left office voluntarily. Meles is just continuing the tradition.
In my opinion we have what looks like a democracy from the outside looking in but when you take a closer look inside you can see that what's being done by the regime is just a shell game designed to satisfy the west. Numerous things have been mentioned in this email string to back this up. A constitution, free press, demonstrations and elections will be allowed as long as they don't threaten the power of the regime. An invisible line has been put down which you can cross at your own peril. CUD dared crossed that line and their leaders are now lounging on death row or soon will be after they are convicted by some kangaroo court.
But all this aside I truly believe that the solution to our problem is what I suggested above in re to the voting process. It has to be free, fair and fully transparent. It is in the best interests of supporters of all sides to focus there energies in making this come about. The Ethiopian people need to feel that their politicians were elected legally. Then the debate can shift to economics, education etc and the development of our country. We have to know who truly won otherwise nothing else matters. You cannot have economic development in a destabilized environment created by the anger of the disenfranchised masses. No progress.
In 2000 I was angry at the US supreme court for allowing Bush to steal an election. In 2004 I was angry at the American people for voting for such an idiot but I accepted\r\n the results. The former was much worse because my anger never dissipated since I felt like I was robbed. I think a lot of Ethiopians are feeling the same way now. I\'d rather have EPRDF win fair and square and me feel angry at the Ethiopian people for voting for them. At least then they would deserve whatever pain was being inflicted on them, but al least they would have the option of making a change in the next election. I feel frustrated now because not only do I feel in my gut that EPRDF stole the last election but I feel like they are going to keep stealing elections for some time to come unless something is done about it. I fear Meles is going to still be in power while he is collecting his social security check.
----Si---
In my opinion we have what looks like a democracy from the outside looking in but when you take a closer look inside you can see that what's being done by the regime is just a shell game designed to satisfy the west. Numerous things have been mentioned in this email string to back this up. A constitution, free press, demonstrations and elections will be allowed as long as they don't threaten the power of the regime. An invisible line has been put down which you can cross at your own peril. CUD dared crossed that line and their leaders are now lounging on death row or soon will be after they are convicted by some kangaroo court.
But all this aside I truly believe that the solution to our problem is what I suggested above in re to the voting process. It has to be free, fair and fully transparent. It is in the best interests of supporters of all sides to focus there energies in making this come about. The Ethiopian people need to feel that their politicians were elected legally. Then the debate can shift to economics, education etc and the development of our country. We have to know who truly won otherwise nothing else matters. You cannot have economic development in a destabilized environment created by the anger of the disenfranchised masses. No progress.
In 2000 I was angry at the US supreme court for allowing Bush to steal an election. In 2004 I was angry at the American people for voting for such an idiot but I accepted\r\n the results. The former was much worse because my anger never dissipated since I felt like I was robbed. I think a lot of Ethiopians are feeling the same way now. I\'d rather have EPRDF win fair and square and me feel angry at the Ethiopian people for voting for them. At least then they would deserve whatever pain was being inflicted on them, but al least they would have the option of making a change in the next election. I feel frustrated now because not only do I feel in my gut that EPRDF stole the last election but I feel like they are going to keep stealing elections for some time to come unless something is done about it. I fear Meles is going to still be in power while he is collecting his social security check.
----Si---
posted by Mechachal yichalal at 1:12 PM
6 Comments:
Paul Henze response to Prof. Clapham
Dear Christopher,
Thanks for forwarding your letter to Tekeda. It is a tour de force, For you go a long way toward reconciling your Tswalu presentation with your present critique (by the way, would you send me a copy of your Tswalu presentation?).
Nevertheless, I still have reservations about some of the points you make. The enthusiasm with which many opponents of the present government in Ethiopia have received your observations does not, in many cases I fear, spring from a desire to see welcome efforts at considered judgment of the factors involved, but from mere joy at seeing the EPRDF government denigrated and embarrassed by an erstwhile supporter.
You underestimate the pernicious role of the diaspora, especially the diaspora in Washington DC and other parts of the United States. These people are not only, for the most part, strongly oriented toward traditional Amhara-Centrist concepts of Ethiopia; they are also heavily infiltrated by Derg elements. They are looking backward, not forward. They are engaging in scurrilous efforts to harass and denigrate all elements who do not agree with them--particularly Tigrayans, of course, but also others. Their behavior exacerbates the present situation and makes it extremely difficult to work toward a rational effort to mitigate strains and differences in Ethiopia itself. The US Government, fortunately, has been largely immune to their pressures, but they are agitating among Congressmen (never too difficult a task) to force the Administration to undertake punitive measures against Ethiopia which can only damage its economy and prospects for development and drive the EPRDF further into intransigence. They are also taking advantage of the large component of Ethiopians who work in the World Bank (many of them former officials of the HSI government) to press for lessening of World Bank support for Ethiopia. Their efforts to boycott Ethiopian Airlines and discourage trade with Ethiopia will harm the Ethiopian population far more than they will harm the EPRDF. Efforts must be made to concentrate the focus of Ethiopian politics IN ETHIOPIA ITSELF rather in the diaspora.
I see no prospect of bringing about a rational readjustment of the Ethiopian political situation if it is scene as a stand-off between the diaspora and the EPRDF government or if efforts to improve the present situation take the form of "mediation" between the CUD and the EPRDF. What the EPRDF has done for Ethiopie entitles it to play a role--not necessarily an exclusive role--on the Ethiopian political scene indefinitely into the future. The diaspora wants to see it destroyed. The same impression, unfortunately, is conveyed by many of the declarations of CUD leaders and their advocates. A zero-sum approach to Ethiopian politics can only have negative results, as you demonstrate in your comments.
I am less ready than you to accept the notion that the CUD has been essentially faultless in refraining from resorting to tactics that would encourage violence. The government needs to produce more specific evidence; of course, to make a legal case for punishment and accusations of treason may be --at least tactically--excessive. But a government in power which regards itself as having been the victim of an extra-legal effort to overthrow it is entitled to make its case before its own population as well as international authorities and have its evidence judged.
I also tend to question your benign judgment of the role of individuals such as Siegfried Pausewang (whom I have long known) and Ana Gomes(whom I do not know). In any event Pausewang had no direct role in election actions, though Ana Gomes did. The EPRDF case against her is at least worth hearing.
Elections in countries which have no tradition or experience of democratic competition will continue to be problematic. Enthusiasts of elections as the key to establishment of democracy are reconsidering their dogma in light of experiences in a wide range of countries where relatively open voting processes have nevertheless been prelude to violent confrontation and some are doing so. The important task for those of us who want to see democratic procedures firmly established in countries which will in the long run benefit from them is to find ways of educating both the elements in power and the populations at large in ways of composing differences and developing mechanisms for peaceful transition of authority. With all the promise it originally seemed to offer, the recent electoral experience in Ethiopia does not seem to have furthered that objective.
Let's keep up the discussion--but let's try to encourage less heat and more light!
____________________________
Comment On Professor Clapham's Response To Dr. Tekeda
__________________________________
By Kassa Kebede(Ph.D)
Dec 12, 2005
Professor Clapham, in your response to Dr. Tekeda you suggest your aim has been to explore weaknesses in the government's position that manifested themselves in the elections and their aftermath, and ask how there are to be explained. It might be easier if you were rather better informed. There are serious omissions and errors in your reply. Indeed, your uncritical dependence upon opposition claims is so great it would appear that you have not been in Ethiopia recently, and certainly not during the election period. Indeed, if I am not mistaken you haven't carried out any serious research here in Ethiopia since mid-2002- I have to say it shows.
You claim that in commenting upon government failures you did not intend to express unqualified support for the opposition and/or the CUD. But this is exactly what you have done, especially in suggesting your three options: that the government should give up power peacefully, or violently or retain its hold on power by repression. There are surely other options, not least that the government might hold onto power peacefully. Given the attitude of the CUD (have you read the articles of its supporters on the Internet?) your alternatives can only be described as extraordinarily dangerous. And given your reputation it is ingenuous to think you would not have an impact.
You apparently believe that there is no link between those in the Diaspora "with no need to adapt their comments to political realities "and those who engage "with great courage in democratic politics in Ethiopia ". This is hardly the case - the contracts, the links, the financing, and, yes the threats against those prepared to be brave enough to join parliament, are matters of public record. The comments from the diaspora, many of which would lead to prosecution for incitement to racial hatred in your own country relate very closely to opposition politics here in Ethiopia.
If you are serious in suggesting you have no reason to believe that CUD leaders are so foolish as to want to reconstruct the "kind of relationship between government and nationalities existing under Haile Selassie or the Derg" then you clearly haven't read much of the material put out by the CUD, particularly that in Amharic or listened to their speeches. This is exactly why the CUD elements of the opposition could never have won the election. Their policies are aimed precisely at the minority who do look back to the Amhara-centric vision of the past. They want to see Article 39 removed, and changes made in the constitution that would radically change the current federation. These are people who claim that the whole purpose of the EPRDF's imaginative policy (your phrase) to deal with the problem of nationalities in Ethiopia was the destruction of the Ethiopian state. It is very clear you have failed to study the opposition, its leadership, its make-up, policies or aims in any detail.
You claim that the EPRDF has failed to translate its achievements into electoral support. To some degree this is clearly true, but your analysis is based upon CUD claims of victory, not on electoral returns, and on a worryingly ignorant confusion of the CUD with the UEDF, OFDM and others. The CUD did not win electoral support outside certain specific areas. This is clear from the most superficial analysis of the returns and from the reports of the AU, Carter Center, ERIS and others, indeed even the EU. It is true that the EU observers were more numerous than others, but the numbers were still entirely insufficient. Any one who claims to give results of the election from the EU monitoring and observation reports can only be wholly mistaken.
Certainly there was, as even the government admits, a considerable amount of fraud and intimidation. There was a massive protest vote, not surprisingly, as you note, against a government that has been in power for so long, and which has failed to solve the intractable problems of poverty, employment and food. But this certainly didn't translate into support for the CUD except in the urban areas and in the Amhara region. The CUD failed to gain any significant support in Oromia (with the exception of Addis Ababa where there was strong protest vote over the moving of the capital of Oromo region to Adama), or in much of the South, and in the Afar, Somali, Tigrai, Beni-Shangul Gumuz and Gambella regions.
In the urban areas, including Dire Dawa, Harar and Addis Ababa, the CUD gained the protest vote, but as any analysis of the vote in Addis Ababa demonstrates it was UEDP-Medihn and Rainbow, particularly the former, which were the main architect of its success, not AEUP. This holds true for all the urban areas, though of course the substantial Amhara element in the cities made a significant difference in all of the main towns. Incidentally, you suggest that urban development has been limited to a very few cities. Actually, as you must be aware, we don't have very many cities, but there have certainly been some impressive changes in Gondar, Bahr Dar, Dire Dawa, Harar, Makelle, Adua, Dessie, Awassa, Shashemene, Dilla, Nazareth and Addis Ababa; almost all the main cities, in recent years. Jobs, of course, do remain at a premium, I agree. Nobody here would dispute that the main CUD support came from the Amhara and that its policies were designed to attract Amhara support. This is not enough to give, victory.
The other main area of omission is your failure to look at the support for the EPRDF. This is far wider than opposition allegations would suggest or than you appear to think. There are significant number of reasons why people might vote for the EPRDF, whether in Oromia, despite the activities of the OLF (grossly exaggerated by the OLF outside Ethiopia), or in the Amhara region where there are all sorts of regional variations - and where the ANDM certainly does have strong support in some areas. Don't be misled by your own obvious dislike to Bereket Simon to assume this can necessarily be translated into widespread support for the AEUP. Your analysis would benefit if you could bring yourself to allow some skepticism of opposition claims, and were prepared to look at the EPRDF's claims with some degree of impartiality.
I have to say that I do not see how you can regard Professor Levine in the US as an accurate source for the electoral process. And on this subject, the point about Ana Gomes' work is not whether she did brave work in East Timor but that she did not abide by the EU directives for monitors. She allowed herself to appear partial, making comments that were seized upon by the opposition and used in the political process. This is a matter of record, and by any standards she behaved in a highly unprofessional manner. Her subsequent remarks accord badly with her position as head of an EU's Electoral Monitoring Mission. To quote your analogy, the complaint is not against the referee's activity as a referee, but because she participated in the game and tried to score a goal. To continue the metaphor, I would also have to say that her job was not to be a referee in any case, but only a lineswoman, or an observer.
By the way I doubt that you have seen the Memorandum, the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry sent to the EU in early September detailing point by point the violation by the EU-EOM of its own Code of Conduct and the Code of Conduct that was signed between the EU Commission's representative and the Ethiopian Government. It is a damning Memorandum which the EU has not yet responded to. It is an official document available in the public domain. Reading it would have made you less confident of Ana Gomes.
The issue of the violence must be deplored, but, as promised, this is going to be subject to an investigation, and you, like most others, appear to forget that seven policemen were killed, as well as numerous civilians. I believe there was a very substantial outcry in the UK just recently when just one policewoman was killed in the line of duty. By the way, in your previous piece you claimed that the killings at Awassa in 2002 were never investigated. This is not true. There was an investigation and a number of police officers were dismissed and jailed and others disciplined.
I have not space to go into other areas where I believe your absence from Ethiopia and your partiality for certain members of the opposition have led you into serious errors of fact and judgment. But I would correct one other point as this again may have a wider impact. The statistics you quote for business operations are certainly out-of-date. The US Embassy's latest Guide on How to Do Business in Ethiopia notes that there are no discriminatory or excessively onerous visas, residence or work permit requirements for foreign investors. The latest Ministry of Finance and Economic Development figures for a Business Registration trade License is 2 days with a similar time for industrial or company registration and for investment licenses. Certainly they may take a little longer if there are queues, but most trade licenses are issued well within a morning or afternoon, and customs permits and requirements for export/imports take a similar time.
Professor Clapham, an academic of your reputation and experience should surely be more careful not to leap into print on the basis of insufficient and partial evidence. Your books display an impressive record of careful, accurate and detailed scholarship on Ethiopia. It is disappointing to see this thrown away so easily even on an ephemeral Internet exchange.
Prof. Clapham's reply to State Minister Takeda Alemu
(Distributed with the author's permission.)
5 December 2005
H.E. Takeda Alemu,
State Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Addis Ababa
Dear Takeda,
Thank you for your open letter of 17 November, raising some points about my earlier ‘Comments on the Ethiopian Crisis’. I have received so many messages of thanks and congratulations since those comments were published on the internet that it is entirely right that I should also be subjected to some more critical observations, both from yourself and from others. Ethiopia is an extremely complex country, about which there is understandably a great variety of opinions, which are held with sincerity and – especially at times like the present – often with passion. All I can do is put forward my own views, together with the reasons that lead me to hold them, and leave to others the opportunity to present alternatives. I was particularly pleased to receive your comments, not only because of your deservedly high position in the Ethiopian Government, but because I have known you since we both taught together in the Department of Political Science and International Relations in Addis Ababa University exactly twenty years ago, when I was a visiting professor there and you were teaching with great dedication on a part-time basis, while already holding a high position in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Thank you also for referring so generously to the presentation about Ethiopia that I made at a meeting in South Africa which we both attended in April 2004. It may be helpful to note the circumstances both of this presentation, and of my more recent comments, to help explain the differences in tone (though not, I think, in basic argument) between them. The meeting at Tswalu was a gathering by invitation of a number of very notable Africans, together with a few external commentators, to think over some of the issues facing the continent in the relaxed atmosphere provided by a private game lodge in the Kalahari. The theme on that occasion was the particular problems involved in governing Africa’s largest states – including Nigeria, Ethiopia, South Africa, and the Democratic Republic of Congo – and I was particularly honoured to be invited to make the initial presentation on the Ethiopian case, to which (as you note) it was expected and intended that Ato Meles Zenawi would reply. In the event, other urgent commitments of the kind that a Head of Government can never escape prevented his attendance, and you very ably substituted for him – though, inevitably, without quite being able to fill the gap left by such an articulate leader. Since the whole object of the occasion was to promote a friendly and constructive discussion, and since in any event there are proper diplomatic courtesies which need to be respected when addressing a national leader about issues in his own country, the misgivings which I already felt about some of the developments in Ethiopia were couched in a coded form with which Ethiopians are perfectly familiar, and which Ato Meles would undoubtedly have decoded and taken up. Your own comments on my presentation at the time were much kinder than I suspect that Ato Meles’ would have been. The paper has since been revised, in the light of comments at the meeting (including your own) and subsequent developments, and will be published early next year in a volume on governing large states in Africa by Witwatersrand University Press. The most important of those subsequent developments are of course the May 2005 elections in Ethiopia and their repercussions. Since these had not occurred at the time of the original presentation, I obviously could not take them into account, and it was only fair to maintain an open mind tinged with optimism towards the future. Sadly, some of my misgivings have now been realised.
The paper with which you compare it, my ‘Comments on the Ethiopian Crisis’, was written in response to a request from my old friend Paul Henze for my views on what was happening in Ethiopia at the present time. Paul and I have talked and corresponded over Ethiopian affairs for many years, and I was happy to take this opportunity to do so. In the event, my views turned out on this occasion to be rather different from his, and he replied with a statement of his own position which you will certainly have read. Since I had also sent my comments to a number of other people who had asked for them, Paul’s response followed, and before we knew where we were, an exchange of views between friends had turned into what I have seen referred to on the internet as ‘the great Clapham-Henze debate’, to which other commentators including yourself have in turn contributed. A paper written originally as a personal letter will inevitably differ in tone from one written for a public occasion in the presence of the national leader, but the underlying argument is the same. There are not two Professor Claphams, as you are inclined to suppose, but just the one. Nor do I in any way regret that my comments have now become public. For one thing, when academic commentators express opinions that may (if your own assessment is correct) have some impact on events, it is only right that they should do so in a form in which they can be openly assessed and criticised, rather than through secretive channels. And equally, I feel that one thing that concerned outsiders such as myself (and of course Paul Henze and others) can do to help Ethiopia at times such as the present is to make our expertise (such as it is) available in the form of open comment and analysis. I am deeply aware that as a retired academic I have a position of privilege denied to many others (including yourself) who are necessarily constrained in what they can write, and which should not be abused.
To come onto the substance of your comments, I would certainly start by agreeing that in a great many respects, the EPRDF regime has been a very significant improvement over its immediate predecessor – not, admittedly, that this would be difficult. Considerable improvements have been made in liberalising the economy (despite some continuing weaknesses), and there has been a dramatic improvement in the openness of the society, notably through the emergence of a free press. The EPRDF likewise came up with an imaginative policy for resolving the age-old problem of ‘nationalities’ in Ethiopia, through the recognition of the right to autonomy and (in extreme cases) secession. This policy certainly carried considerable dangers, and would inevitably be subject to criticism, whether on the one hand for destroying the unity of the Ethiopian state and nation, or on the other for serving as a cover for continuing highland (and in this case notably Tigrayan) rule; but there was a clearly articulated rationale for it, for which the government deserves credit. There was certainly a basis for the positive elements to which I drew attention in my Tswalu paper, and which you recall in your open letter.
The problem with which I was concerned in my recent Comments was however a different one: to explore the evident weaknesses in the government’s political position that were made all too apparent by the elections and their aftermath, and to ask how these could be explained. I am somewhat reassured that neither you nor any of the other critical commentators on my paper have seriously undertaken to challenge the analysis that I made in the first two pages or so of my Comments, and which therefore continues to stand. This analysis was not concerned with whether the EPRDF regime should be regarded as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ – something that I am quite prepared to leave to Ethiopians to decide for themselves – but rather why it had failed to translate its achievements into electoral support. In some respects, indeed, the EPRDF regime may be compared to the Haile-Selassie monarchy, whose slow demise I observed some forty years ago, and which had likewise created expectations that it was then unable to realise. Just as Haile-Selassie did much to create the class of educated Ethiopians who eventually turned against him, so the EPRDF, through its opening up of political space and especially the mobilisation of ethnic identities, has helped to create the forces that are now challenging it.
The central problem has been its failure to foster the political institutions and processes that were needed to make the new system work. ‘Politics’, in a pluralist society such as Ethiopia has now become, is a process that involves recognising the autonomy and legitimacy of different sources of organised political power, and then devising mechanisms for achieving agreement, by arguing, listening, persuading, forming common cause with people and groups with which you agree on some things (though not everything), and symbolising identities and aspirations that large numbers of your fellow citizens share. I recognise, as I noted in the Tswalu paper, that this has been particularly difficult to achieve in Ethiopia, but there is nonetheless no alternative to it. It is something that Ethiopians have to learn, however hard it may be. And it is also something that the EPRDF government has been particularly poor at achieving. This would have required the government, having created regional autonomy on a ‘nationality’ basis, to recognise the right of the different nationalities to choose their own leaders, who would necessarily have held rather different views from the government in Addis Ababa, and have been answerable to their own peoples. They would in turn then have needed to bargain over policy with the leaders of other nationalities and with the central government. This has never been allowed to happen, and the EPRDF is paying the price for it. A particularly telling example was the killing in May 2002 of Sidamas who were peacefully demonstrating over an issue as manageable as the status of the city of Awassa.
In making these comments about the failures of the government, it was certainly not my intention to express unqualified support for the opposition, and notably the CUD. They too, like the EPRDF and other opposition groups such as the UEDF, have their weaknesses, and they too need to learn the arts of political management. The same goes to an even greater extent for those groups and individual commentators who pass judgement on Ethiopian affairs from the sanctuary of the diaspora, and because they need only to address external audiences, have no need to adapt their comments to political realities in the country itself. One of the great hopes opened up by the recent elections was that they would encourage open political argument to take place within Ethiopia, and would enable groups which have hitherto engaged in exile politics (among which the OLF is particularly significant) to return home and participate in the complex and extremely difficult task of devising an acceptable political order for Ethiopia and its peoples. Correspondingly, the greatest tragedy of the recent developments is that those who did with great courage engage in democratic politics within Ethiopia, and who showed themselves in the process to enjoy very considerable popular support, have been imprisoned and charged with capital offences by the government of which you form part, while some of their supporters have been killed on the streets of Addis Ababa. While there must be considerable doubt about whether the leaders of the opposition parties deliberately engaged in violence, and I am inclined to accept the view of Amnesty International that they did not, there can be no doubt at all that the present Ethiopian government was prepared to engage in very considerable violence as soon as it found that its position was threatened. In these circumstances, those who continue to criticise the present government from the safety of exile can scarcely be blamed for refusing to risk their own necks by doing so at home.
Politics is a trade in which there is no alternative to experience: it is only by engaging in the very challenging task of attempting to govern a country as difficult as Ethiopia that politicians can learn what is and is not practicable, and acquire the skills needed for the purpose. The EPRDF showed rapidly after 1991 that the attitudes gained in opposition could rapidly be adapted to the needs of government, under circumstances very different from those to which they had become accustomed during their long struggle against the Derg regime. They were greatly assisted in the process by the willingness of dedicated civil servants such as yourself to remain at their posts, and guide them in the learning process that they certainly required. (It was, I suspect, in large part because they lacked the stabilising influence of an inherited state apparatus that the EPLF in Eritrea was quite unable to make the same transition as the EPRDF in Ethiopia.) The leadership of the present domestic opposition parties, as I pointed out in my previous Comments, come from a far more conducive environment than did Ato Meles and his colleagues. But they too have a lot to learn, and it is a tragedy that the opportunity for them to do so now appears to have been irreparably lost.
The principal task facing whoever governs Ethiopia is clearly to find some way (or indeed, at worst, to find whether there is a way) of reconciling the different social and political communities of which the country is composed. The CUD, in seeking to represent the aspirations of those many Ethiopians who feel that the country comprises, as base, a single political community, was certainly speaking for a legitimate political community that had every right to a voice. But those who seek to represent other constituencies, and notably those of specific nationalities such as the Oromo, the various southern peoples, and the Somalis, likewise have a legitimate voice that has every right to participate fully in the political process. Should the leaders of the CUD have supposed that they could reconstitute the kind of relationship between the central government and the various nationalities that existing under the Haile-Selassie or Derg regimes (and I have no reason to believe that they were so foolish), then they would rapidly have discovered that this is no longer an option in today’s Ethiopia. That is what a democratic learning process is about. Such a process is needed every bit as much on the part of those who claim to represent the various leading nationalities. I would in particular very much welcome a considered analysis of recent developments, including the levels of support gained in the recent elections by the different opposition parties in various parts of Oromia, from a qualified Oromo commentator, and much regret that I have not yet seen one.
I likewise make no apology for referring at a number of points to the distinctively Marxist intellectual frame of reference of the leading members of the present government, and to its influence on many of their attitudes and policies. It is certainly the case, as you point out, that almost all educated Ethiopians of their generation held Marxist views; many did so with great dedication at times of intense danger, and lost their lives as a result. This was not mere student fashion, but a serious attempt to work out an intellectual response to the evident problems of Ethiopia, for which I have every respect. For many of those who remained in Derg-controlled Ethiopia, Marxism lost its allure as a result of the brutality and appallingly mistaken policies committed in its name. But for those like Ato Meles and his colleagues, who adapted it as an ideology of insurgent warfare (which across the world, from China through southeast Asia to southern Africa, Yugoslavia and Cuba, has unquestionably been the role in which Marxism has been most successful), their deeply held Marxist precepts could only be reinforced by their eventual triumph. Despite their evident success in adapting to the changed global situation since the end of the Cold War, these precepts continue in my view to inform their behaviour, across a range of policies from land tenure to their own conception of their right to rule, and the ‘democratic centralist’ organisation of the EPRDF itself.
One area in which I am happy to acknowledge an improvement is in Ethiopia’s receptivity to foreign investment, even though little investment has actually been received, and much remains to be done. The impressions cited in my Comments derived from the time of the Tswalu conference. However, Ethiopia’s position is dramatically less favourable than the impression given by your colleague suggests. On the website most widely used by corporations for assessing the ease of doing business around the world, www.doingbusiness.org, Ethiopia ranks 101st out of 145 national economies in the overall ease of doing business. On the specific indicator that you cite, the time taken to start a business, Ethiopia ranks 94th, with a time required of 32 days – a far cry from the 2 hours that you claim. I suggest that you ask your colleague to check his own figures against those of an objective external source, and either draw attention to any ways in which he may feel that Ethiopia’s performance has been undervalued, or else adapt his assertions to achieve some measure of credibility.
On the other hand, since you choose to liken the Ethiopian political process to a soccer game, in which there are rules administered by referees, I must also suggest that this analogy becomes somewhat misleading when the referee is also one of the players. Neutral referees can only be found amongst those who do not themselves have a stake in the outcome of the game, two examples of which to whom you refer are Dr. Pausewang of the Christian Michelson Institute in Norway and Ms. Ana Gomes of the European Union observer mission. In each case, you repeat allegations that the referee was biased against you. On the basis of my own long familiarity with his work, I can only testify that Dr. Pausewang is an experienced observer of scrupulous honesty and impartiality, who has the interests of Ethiopia and of all Ethiopians very much at heart. Ana Gomes earned widespread respect for her courage and integrity in East Timor, and attempts to disparage her can likewise only be counterproductive, especially in Europe. The team that attacks the referee is usually the one that has been committing the fouls.
I am sorry that my views on recent issues should have set me at odds with two such old friends as yourself and Paul Henze, but hope that the expression of our respective opinions will help to contribute to constructive discussion on issues which are very much in need of public debate. I appreciate that you write as a member of a government whose views must necessarily reflect those of the administration that he serves, and would like to assure you that my respect for your abilities is in no way diminished by the opinions that you have been called on to express.
Yours sincerely,
Christopher Clapham
Centre of African Studies, University of Cambridge
Open Letter
By: Tekeda Alemu
-----------------------------------
November 17, 2005
Dear Professor Clapham,
I could not resist the urge to write to you in response to your November 7, 2005, contribution: "Comments on the Ethiopian Crisis". I thought also that my comment should be in the form of an open letter. I have a very simple reason for this -- your contribution which has the potential of misleading many, has had very wide circulation. It could thus have some damaging effect on our country.
Frankly speaking, I would not have selected to respond in this fashion if I did not feel that I had a story to tell which might help readers to put this latest contribution of yours in the proper perspective.
I have known you, Professor Clapham, for many years. In fact, I have known of you, through your first book on Ethiopia -- a sort of a sequel to Margery Perham's work, The Government of Ethiopia. Thus, I regard you, more or less, as my teacher, though we have never been together in the same class. I believe we might have had an opportunity to meet over the last 14 years a few times, I suppose one or two times in my office.
But what I find most memorable --- all the more so now in light of your latest contribution on Ethiopia --- is our encounter in South Africa, in April 2004, specifically at that magnificent desert resort in the Kalahari, South Africa, in connection with the Tswalu Dialogue. I was there representing Prime Minster Meles who could not accept the invitation because of other commitments he had. Since I know you are an honourable man, I have no doubt, you would not attempt to contradict me if I said you wanted Prime Minister Meles to be at the Dialogue as much as the organizers of the meeting did, to comment on the short paper you had prepared on Ethiopia --- "The Challenge of Democratization...." You wanted the Ethiopian Prime Minister to be at the Dialogue so much that, if you recall, that was the only time we ever had communication. We have not had any contact since.
From the vantage point of a little less than two years from that Dialogue, what is important is not that you went out of your way to seek out the Ethiopian Prime Minister to join you at Tswalu to comment on your paper, but rather --- in light of the tone and content of your latest contribution --- what you said in the paper you presented at the Dialogue about the EPRDF and about post-1991 Ethiopia.
I would not be surprised if people would find it difficult to believe that the same author would be responsible for the two contributions, the first one written in April 2004, and the second penned in November 2005. With all due respect, Professor Clapham, it is like there are two Professor Claphams --- the first, that of the "The Challenge of Democratization in Ethiopia." Here, I must tell you in all honesty, you were in your best form as a scholar and as an academic. This was the paper that you wanted the Ethiopian Prime Minister to comment on. Despite the very many efforts you made, you could not succeed, and what you had was me as a substitute. I have to admit, I must have mumbled something, but I did not do justice to the wonderful paper you presented on the challenges of democratization in Ethiopia. You were also very generous towards the EPRDF in that paper and though you still retained some scholarly skepticism, you made it clear nonetheless that 1991 was a watershed in the history of Ethiopia and that the EPRDF had brought Ethiopia almost to the doorsteps of democratic governance. I shall return to this theme in a moment, but now to the second Professor Chapham, that of "Comments on the Ethiopian Crisis."
What Professor Clapham II Says
Here, one sees no trace of the scholar with 40 years of concentrated labour on matters relating to Ethiopia. You started out with a sentence whose validity is manifest and which reminded one who the author was. "The place to start trying to understand any political crisis is always with the government in power. Oppositions merely fill the gaps left by the incumbent regime." In all frankness, I thought, that opening remark would for sure be a curtain raiser for an analysis of the current Ethiopian crisis only a writes of the caliber of Professor Clapham I would manage to deliver. But what a disappointment. After that magnificent salvo, you immediately descended into polemics which one would normally expect from partisan scribes of political parties, and not from an academic of your caliber and, I might add, of your integrity as a scholar.
The thrust of your analysis suggests that you simply did not care to try to understand why an election which began with so much hope suddenly degenerated into a bloody and ugly confrontation which ought to be excruciatingly painful, not only for patriotic Ethiopians, but also for friends of Ethiopia like your good self. What I have found the most intriguing is how uncharacteristically you have become downright rude in this piece as when you gratuitously refer to our former Minister of Information as "neurotic" in his "pronouncements". I am sure there is no factual basis for your fulmination, as there is absolutely no basis for another outrageous remark you make in which you claim that "Ethiopia retains one of the longest periods in Africa for establishing a business." The truth, Professor Clapham, as I checked with the head of our Investment Office while reading your paper, is that the opposite is true --- Ethiopia makes available to businessmen and women one of the shortest periods in the world for establishing business firms. You could do it within two hours, Professor Clapham.
For some of the factual errors you make, I do not need corroboration from third parties, for since I myself have been directly involved in these events, it is with regrets that I have to point out to you those unscholarly transgressions. You refer to the expulsion of Dr. Siegfried Pausewang as one of the "worrying signs, even before the election took place." But Professor Clapham, if you had discussed the issue with Dr. Pausewang, you would have discovered that long before the election and before Dr. Pousewang's name was ever proposed as one of the observers of EU, questions had been raised in writing and in the form of a critique of his work, about his neutrality. That judgment was made on the merit of his own behavior. For your information, Professor Clapham, I myself had a long exchange of views with Dr. Pausewang before he left Ethiopia prior to the election. I thought we had a very civilized exchange of views and the position of the Ethiopian Government was explained to him in as frank a manner as possible. The point is, Professor Clapham, even with respect to matters that could be easily verified you have been, in this second paper, rather careless, sloppy, and utterly un academic.
What is most revealing, however, is how you have been so unreasonably harsh on the EPRDF in this paper while you have been so much indefatigable in your effort to find excuses for the shortcomings of the opposition, so much so that at times the whole enterprise looks comical. "The opposition is caught in a bind", you assert in all confidence. "On the one hand, it cannot simply accept election results that it has every reason to believe are fraudulent", you argue. While on the other hand, you tell us, the opposition "has no interest in escalating violence, which would only play into the hands of a government that possesses a monopoly of organized force and has not the slightest hesitation to use it." Not even the best minds from the opposition have managed to come up with an argument lending a plausible cover of reasonableness for the policy of the opposition while in fact that policy was responsible for the post-election mess that the country was forced to get into. "The resort to peaceful demonstrations and boycotts is an obvious compromise" for the opposition to follow, you said, "even though there is an evident danger that these may get out of hand, and result in looting or violence." You know, on the other hand, even in soccer games there are rules administered by referees and you don't change either the rules or the referee in the middle of the game, no matter how bad either the rules or the referee might be. There cannot be the rule of law if this very rudimentary and basic principle is not adhered to, something, which, as a teacher, you should be the first to stand for, and defend. Tell me, Professor Clapham, on the basis of what principle do you justify the assertion you make that the opposition "cannot simply accept election results that it has every reason to believe are fraudulent." Would you have given the same advice to the then U.S. Vice President Al Gore in 2000 in connection with the Florida election fiasco? What if, just as the opposition, the ruling party felt, as it should, that it has every reason to believe that it had won? That is why we all have to leave under the law, and you don't change the law in the middle of the game. On this, Professor Clapham, you are not being a good example.
In contrast, you seem to always be looking for diabolic motives for what you claim has been carried out by the ruling party. You claim that the government "has an interest in presenting" the opposition "as violent, criminal or treasonable, and fomenting the conditions under which it will be able to suppress it by force." This is being said, Professor Clapham, of a ruling party that has made it clear right from the beginning that it was ready to handover the administration of Addis Ababa. It is not that you are not fair to the ruling party or considerate of the fragile democratization process in Ethiopia, but you are also reckless and careless about your own academic credentials, and your scholarly standing.
Your choice of witnesses for your biased position on whether there was "significant rigging" was almost laughable. You tell us that the "EU observer mission, the Ethiopian Human Right Council, and Donald Levine in his correspondence with Ethiopian diplomats in the United States, have convincingly demonstrated that significant rigging took place." For those who have some familiarity with EU-EOM and, its head, with respect to whom the attribute of neutrality is a manifest oxymoron, the judgment you make about the fairness or unfairness of the election based on the sources you have chosen, does not enhance your credibility and constitutes another confirmation of your bias against the ruling party.
What is most revealing about your latest paper is how, unlike the position you took in April 2004, this time around, you harp on the theme that the underlying Marxist-Leninist ideology of the ruling party has been an impediment to the democratization of the country, as well as to its economic progress.
Here, I cannot resist the temptation to make a brief digression. You see, Professor Clapham, for reasons that are rather difficult for me to fathom, you have tried to make so much out of the Marxian background of the EPRDF. You seem to be insinuating that once a Marxist, always a Marxist, and that is what the EPRDF is. But, Professor Clapham, who among members of our generation, has not been a Marxist, unless he was dumb, intellectually lazy, unconcerned about the fate of his country, or unless he was extremely bright, bordering on the genius, almost a demigod. You see, those you talk about in your November paper as if they are trash are people who acted on their conviction and decided to fight for a cause while the rest of us, including your "Western-oriented Sophisticates," chose a less hazardous route for their life experience, some leading, until the Ethiopian political terrain was made ready for safe political participation, lives that were rather frivolous. Please, Professor Clapham, dispense with your Marxist-Leninist bugaboo. The world has changed, and no one will take your insinuation seriously. But if you believe that commitment to social justice, democracy, and equality among peoples, is a proclivity which is a throwback to one's Marxist period, then you have a philosophical problem to resolve.
But what did Professor Clapham I say as close as less than two year ago?
Post-1991 Ethiopia According
To Professor Clapham I
You recall, Professor Clapham, that paper you presented at the Tswalu Dialogue on Friday, 30 April 2004 dealt both with the challenges and the sources of hope for the democratization of Ethiopia. Talking about the challenges, you referred to a number of factors --- of history, structure, culture, among others -- that have contributed to making the achievement of democracy in Ethiopia extremely difficult.
With respect to the challenge of history, you said, though "the past does not determine the future", nonetheless, "history does establish patterns that may guide people's expectations, and make democracy harder or easier to achieve". Then you set forth the following concerning Ethiopia which I thought at the time, and still feel, was very relevant:
In Ethiopia's case, it makes it harder. Throughout the distinguished past that makes it Africa's oldest State, it has never (prior to the accession of the present government in 1991) had any regime with the slightest plausible claim to democracy, and it has lacked much of the basic experience that we tend to take for granted in other parts of the continent.
When it comes to the challenge of structure, you made references to two factors --- the nature of the Ethiopian State and the process of its formation, and the rugged topography of the country. In connection with the dynamics of state formation, what you thought pertinent in terms of the challenges to democratization was, in you own words "The rapid expansion of the country's territory, especially in the late nineteenth century, that led to the incorporation (and in many places, the ruthless exploitation) of other peoples, who were generally regarded as inferior, and had very limited (if any) opportunity to participate in government." You then made the following conclusion which I thought was again relevant and valid:
Ethiopia was therefore dogged by a premise of inequality, in which full incorporation into the State required the abandonment of one's own indigenous culture and identity, and the assumption -- in terms of name, religion, food and dress, language --- of those historically associated with the state. Many individuals made this transition and rose to the highest position in government; but many more were alienated from and oppressed by the state in a way that would inevitably deeply affect political attitudes once they gained the democratic ability to express them.
You then turn to the country's topography as well as to its diversity and argue that:
A number of African countries certainly enjoy a comparable diversity, though few have such rugged topography or such poor communication, but when combined with other factors, this diversity makes the maintenance of consensual political structures considerably more complex.
When you talked about the cultural constraints to the democratization of Ethiopia, you were even more convincing, thus all the more perplexing, why you chose to be so simplistic in your latest contribution. You said in your Tswalu paper less than two years ago, that "Ethiopian state culture" places "enormous emphasis on hierarchy and obedience." On one hand, you argued, this culture of obedience has been responsible for Ethiopia's many achievements, "including the maintenance of effective government over many centuries and over a huge area, the military capacity that ensured the country's independence from colonial rule, and the ability to absorb upheavals that would have shattered a less solidly established state".
Then you make a very interesting remark in terms of the downside of culture as a challenge to the democratization of Ethiopia. You said:
This culture of obedience does however place considerable obstacle in the way of conventional multi-party democracy.
You explain how this cultural background might make it difficult for the average Ethiopian to vote against the government as it might also make many an official unwilling to contemplate votes against the government. Further expanding this theme, you say the following:
The idea of a 'loyal opposition,' seeking to displace the government by peaceful and constitutional means has been equally difficult to grasp from the viewpoint either of the government itself, or of its would be opponents. Nor does Ethiopian attitudes to power readily lend themselves to bargaining and compromise. Levels of interpersonal trust, which have been identified as critical elements in building the institutions on which democracy depends are characteristically low.
It is not of course all doom and gloom as far as the prospect of democracy is concerned in the Ethiopian context, you told us at TSWALU, less than two years ago. You explain this prospect by setting forth four or five factors that you said would contribute to widening the democratic space in Ethiopia. But before you did that, you made the following comment which I feel is rather paradoxical in light of your demonization of the ruling party, now. Professor Clapham, this is what you said at Tswalu less than two years ago:
This may seem a depressing assessment of Ethiopia's prospects for democracy. It is however essential that we should not treat democracy simply as a formula that can be readily and successfully applied, regardless of the circumstances. Different countries, in Africa as elsewhere, come to it with very different experiences that must be fully taken into account. At the same time, there are also elements in the Ethiopian experience, notably since 1991, that have greatly improved the prospects for democracy, and are bringing about important and very largely positive changes in the way in which Ethiopia is governed. (Emphasis mine)
Your refer to five elements as sources of hope for democracy in Ethiopia, and all but one are interestingly embedded in events associated with the post-1991 development in our country.
You argue, quite persuasively, that the removal of the dictatorial rule of the Derge by the EPRDF had broader implications than the mere removal of a government would normally have had. You told us at Tswalu that the Derge, "sought to destroy all those who opposed it". When it failed, you said:
[T]his was more than the defeat of a single repressive regime: it signaled the inadequacy, indeed the impossibility, of attempting to govern Ethiopia from the top down, and left some form of government that ultimately rested on the consent and participation of the governed as the only remaining option. It likewise alerted Ethiopians, in the most traumatic manner, to the dangers of autocracy and the need for some kind of constraint on those in power. Democracy in many countries had developed from a recognition of the failure of dictatorship, and Ethiopia may be no exception.
I do not believe one could imagine a better tribute to the EPRDF for the role that it has played --- no matter its weaknesses, and those are many ---in making the progress towards democracy in Ethiopia irreversible and, as you so eloquently put it, for heralding "the inadequacy, indeed the impossibility, of attempting to govern Ethiopia from the top down."
Professor Clapham, it would have been nearly impossible having read what Professor Clapham I had said in April 2004 about the EPRDF, to predict what Professor Clapham II would say in November 2005. The real Professor Clapham --- the honourable professor with an amazing insight into the underpinnings of Ethiopian politics --- did not credit the EPRDF merely with making progress towards democracy in Ethiopia more or less irreversible, but he also credited it with having deconstructed "hegemony" in Ethiopia and laying the foundation for a new political system which, while not without potential problems, was nonetheless a system that opened up possibilities for Ethiopians to structure their political relations on the basis of equality. The merit of the new system introduced by the EPRDF in 1991, you said is that:
...[I]t has sought to tackle explicitly the underlying assumption of hegemony on which the Ethiopian State has historically been built, and in the process to lay the foundation for an Ethiopia constructed on the basis of equality between social groups and cultures, not merely between individuals. By far the most important challenge facing Ethiopia is whether this bold experiment will succeed.
This, I suppose, is a very insightful observation which no one can plausibly contest, and this is also what has been confirmed by developments in the post-election period in Ethiopia, though I submit, I do not believe all the problems we have faced are entirely of our own making.
You also told us in Tswalu that for the first time in Ethiopia's history, possibilities were emerging in the country for the emergence of civil society. Democracy, you argued, depends not just on state-level institutions, but also "on a wide range of supportive elements in the society as a whole". During the Derge regime, you told us, "even those feeble organizations that had emerged under the imperial government, were ruthlessly suppressed and subordinated to the ruling power." But things are changing under the EPRDF, you affirmed, and not even once did you mention that the EPRDF leaders were trapped in their Marxist-Leninist past. You said:
One key development since 1991 has been the emergence of a genuinely independent press. This has its deficiencies, to be sure, and is largely restricted to the major cities, but still serves not just as a source of information independent from government, but also (perhaps more important) as a guarantor of independent thought.
The space for civil society and thus for possible progress in fostering democracy, was also expanding in post-1991 Ethiopia in other respects as well, you said a little less than two years ago at our last encounter. Unlike now, when you probably felt that the disturbances of the beginning of November, pointed to the unmaking of the EPRDF, what you said at Tswalu was the following:
...[T]he period since 1991 has seen a burgeoning of independent organizations, including not only the more prominent Addis Ababa-based ones (like the Ethiopian Human Rights Council, or the Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association), but extending widely into provincial politics, in which rival parties and associations compete for attention and support at the local level. There has been a considerable expansion likewise in autonomous economic organizations, extending into areas (such as tertiary education) that were previously the preserve of the state. Ethiopia, in short, has developed a level of pluralism that extends well beyond the state's capacity to control. (Emphasis Mine)
All this, of course is under EPRDF's watch. But this you said in 2004. You take all that away for inexplicable reasons in November 2005, and you almost tell us, there is after all not all that much difference between the Derge and the EPRDF. The following is what Professor Clapham II says of the EPRDF in November 2005:
At no time prior to 1991 had any legitimate opposition been permitted in Ethiopia, and even though the EPRDF government was obliged to accept formal opposition as a result of its need for external support and finance, it has never regarded any opposition movement as legitimate, or as having any right to oust it from power by peaceful electoral means.
By the same logic, one could argue that the EPRDF dismantled the Derge's dictatorship, deconstructed the structure of hegemony in the country and created a space for civil society, to make Europeans and Americans happy, and for some funds to build the EPRDF as an organization. How can, you seem to think, Ethiopians, and Africans, or the poor, be driven by values of equality, justice and democracy?
This is not the first time I hear this being said, but mostly within the context of a not very serious talk among diplomats and non-diplomats, but not by a serious academic whose remarks on fundamental societal and political issues must be weighed carefully lest he ends up conferring validity upon assertions that would have major implications for interpretations of who we are and for how we value our inter-societal relations. If we, as the implication of what you say would lead us to assume, take positions on fundamental issue always after looking at the side of the gallery where you are seated, you would have no cause to take us seriously as independent agents having our own attachments to causes and principles. Professor Clapham, the assertion that "the EPRDF government was obliged to accept formal opposition as a result of its need for external support and finance", is not inconsequential, and has broader implications than you probably thought possible. I hope it is just part of the glib talk that this latest contribution by Professor Clapham II has been suffused with, and nothing more.
But that was not a sentiment I thought one sensed in Professor Clapham of the Tswalu Dialogue of 2004. Among your many insights from which we all benefited in 2004, was what you said about the "Ambivalent Role of the (Ethiopian) Diaspora." This is what you said then, and I thought it was extremely insightful, all the more so in light of the post-election debacle we have faced here in Ethiopia:
The attitudes of exiled Ethiopians towards developments within the country are also often naive in the extreme; Americo-Ethiopians (sic), in particular, often seem quite unable to understand why politics in their country of origin should not immediately assume the same characteristics as in the United States.
What you said in your conclusion at Tswalu was so true and so valid and, moreover, so reflective of the value of a clinical analysis of how societies function, that no matter how I find your November 2005 contribution utterly despicable, honestly speaking, I shall continue to respect you as a serious scholar. This is what Professor Clapham I said in the concluding part of his presentation at Tswalu in 2004 on "The Challenge of Democratization in Ethiopia":
Deeply entrenched attitudes to power and authority --- on the part of opposition groups and not just the government, and most basically in the population as a whole --- continue to impede the development of attitudes and practices on which democracy must ultimately depend. Ethiopia still lacks an adequate political process, through which its diversity can be accommodated within a set of effective and consensual mechanisms of governance.
It is not necessary to agree with everything you said in your conclusion. I for one believe that though what you say about the attitudinal requirements of democracy are pertinent and also this might go a long way to help us make sense of our post-election tragedy, nonetheless we have also seen in our case how the mundane greed for power of a narrow circle of people could wreak havoc on society even when there are possibilities for overcoming cultural constraints to progress in building democracy. Ethiopia may not have been ready in May 2005 for the most advanced form of democracy, whatever that might look like, but we could have had a reasonable achievement towards a reasonably credible multi-party system that would have surprised the world if hardliners within the opposition had not shown contempt for the rule of law and had not decided to go for broke. It is just not true that Ethiopia lacks "adequate political process" for accommodating diversity. Nor is it true that the average Ethiopian, because of attitudinal factors, is not ready to embrace democracy. As for the ruling party, the EPRDF, notwithstanding what is said by Professor Clapham II, the fact is that it has done almost all that was required to ensure that the May election would be fair and free and, following its defeat in Addis Ababa, has made it clear that it would hand over the administration of the city to the winner. That this did not take place is no fault of the ruling party. And that is the truth which will not go away notwithstanding whatever is said to the contrary by those who wish to get us to fight, not for the future of the country, but for causes that were lost or won in the various battles until 1991.
But still the analysis of Professor Clapham I concerning the challenges and promises of democratization in Ethiopia, is by far superior to the analysis offered by Professor Clapham II with respect to the current crisis. The November 2005 contribution lacks honesty and reflects no seriousness of purpose. The last part of your paper, headed "Possible Outcomes", because it should be regarded as beneath contempt, requires no response. Perhaps, in a way, we deserve it. It is partly because this has been a concern of mine for some time that I said, if you recall, the following in my brief and modest contribution at the closing day of the Dialogue at Tswalu:
The most important partnership for peace and development is that which should pertain to the country level. Africa will have little hope of achieving economic development and ensuring durable peace without strong partnership among governments, civil society and the private sector. There is even a need for partnership between ruling and opposition parties on matters affecting national interest. Without loyal opposition, there can be no meaningful politics.... The problems that we in Africa face in this regard are significant. Often, parties belonging to the same country show greater mutual confidence with foreign parties than they do among themselves.
I suppose it is because we have made ourselves so vulnerable, Dear Professor Clapham, that you can have the temerity to contemplate something for present day Ethiopia, which only a buffoon would believe makes sense. I am not sure, although you have known Ethiopia before, that you know the new Ethiopia. Or there must be something I missed that could explain why you behaved in such a bizarre manner in your latest contribution on Ethiopia.
Tekeda Alemu
COMMENTS ON COMMENTS
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By Paul B. Henze
Introduction:
I consider Christopher Clapham's judgment of the current Ethiopian post-electoral crisis too categorical, too negative a review of EPRDF history and performance, and too charitable in its assessment of opposition motivation and behavior. The fact the EPRDF has been 14 years in power does not justify an attempt to replace it by resort to extra-legal methods or incitement to violence. Major opposition groups' long record of refusal to participate in the political process raises serious questions about their leaders' intentions. The comments which follow summarize the most important factors I raised with Christopher in a message to him on 10 November 2005:
TPLF/EPRDF Performance
Having been in close and almost continual contact with the TPLF leadership since 1990, I find it difficult to regard these men as dishonest and inclined toward fraud. They started out as student rebels infected with Marxism-Leninism, it is true. They did not find it easy to shed the illusions that Soviet propaganda among students in the 1960s had left with them. But the best of them--Meles, Seyoum, Berhane Gebre Christos and others--were mentally sharp and had the independence of mind, in spite of their isolation in Tigray, to realize what was happening in the world of the 1980s.
They had avoided dependence on Soviet or Chinese support during their guerrilla struggle. (It is true that the Soviets underestimated and ignored them; but I know of no evidence that they ever seriously sought support from Soviets, East Europeans or Chinese.) By 1990 they had evolved from Tigrayan particularists to Ethiopian patriots, just as I speculated in the mid-1980s that they were likely to do. They did this on their own. But they still came to power with almost no experience in governing. Forming the EPRDF, they led the final phase of the anti-Derg offensive and, on defeating the Derg's armies, proceeded to set up a new kind of government in Ethiopia. Along with recognizing the need to adjust to the realities of the world of the end of the 20th century lay a set of attitudes deriving from the traditional culture of Adwa, not a bad foundation on which to build.
Some early decisions have resulted in difficulty: (1) adherence to ethnic structuralism; (2) Reliance on PDOs; (3) dogma on land ownership. They initially moved too slowly on the economy. They failed to open their own internal political structure. But they took a number of steps that a group eager to establish a permanent dictatorship would have avoided: (1) they opened the society to creation of free institutions--political parties and other kinds of organizations; (2) they encouraged exiles to return and be active politically; (3) they removed restrictions on internal movement of citizens and granted passports freely; (4) they adopted a completely neutral, but not hostile, stance toward religion; (5) they permitted an independent press; (6) they committed themselves to establishing a system of rule of law and set in motion a process for drafting a new constitution; (6) they restored relations with the outside world.
Facing up to economic problems, they embarked on a program for expansion of infrastructure--roads, dams, electric lines and telecommunications). This has laid a sound basis for economic and social progress. They committed themselves to overcoming the famine problem. Some EPRDF approaches worked well and some less so; some had unintended consequences (Removing restrictions on internal movement has resulted in doubling of the population of Addis Ababa, creating the urban proletariat which the CUD has mobilized against them.) Compared to the experience of most ex-communist countries they merit a positive score. Economically they have gradually abandoned restrictive practices and broadened competition, a process not yet complete, but the trends all have been in positive directions. They have achieved respectable levels of economic growth, avoided collapse of the currency (in contrast to the experience of every other post-communist government.) In recent years they have begun to attract Ethiopians from the diaspora to return and invest.
I believe, based on frequent conversations with them in 1990-91, that EPRDF leaders came to power committed to creating a workable multi-party system. They expected exiles to contribute to this process as well as internal groups. The national conference of 1-5 July 1991 is evidence of this commitment. The hasty 1992 elections created an administrative structure but failed to advance opposition party formation. Kifle Wodajo oversaw the creation of a liberal constitution. Meanwhile, however, major opposition groups had evolved in a negative direction. The OLF, which had only partially and reluctantly agreed to cooperate with the EPRDF during the last stages of its southward advance, broke and returned--albeit ineptly--to armed conflict, occasional terrorism and more recently to opportunistic collaboration with hostile Eritrea. Other major groups agitated for roles in government without demonstrating capacity to perform and fell into a pattern of rejectionism and non-participation. Avoiding serious policy prescriptions, they concentrated instead on appealing to all-too-willing, well-intentioned but naive foreign governments and sympathizers to force the EPRDF to share power with them. This led to a steadily down-spiralling syndrome which has brought the country to the current crisis.
Opposition Evolution
Opposition groups displayed little creativity and no skill in taking advantage of the openings the constitution offered for gaining influence and participating in the political process. Friendly foreign governments and private organizations failed to insist that opposition parties recognize the most basic requirement of democratic practice: that participation is necessary for political effectiveness. The EPRDF commitment to regionalization offered openings for political activity on local and regional levels which were never exploited by opposition leaders focussed exclusively on the center. Persistent rejectionism, combined in recent years with reduced response from foreign governments and private organizations, frustrated opposition parties and led them to think in terms of action outside the electoral framework. The EPRDF became increasingly disinclined to regard opposition leaders as partners for negotiation. Both government and opposition thus encouraged the worst tendencies of each other.
The decision of CUD and UEDF, along with a few minor parties, to participate in the May 2005 elections seemed to demonstrate that they had at last abandoned rejectionism and were ready to compete wholeheartedly in the political process. The EPRDF committed itself to open elections and invited significant groups of foreign observers. Preparations were elaborate and met the approval of foreign governments and international organizations. The final phase of the campaign saw brought opposition demonstrations with an excess of demagogic rhetoric--calls for reversal of Eritrean independence, takeover of Assab and unrealistic economic and social promises. CUD let the impression spread that it championed the interests of the Amhara and of Orthodox Christians. Its excessively vocal diaspora support has tended to reinforce this perception. Extreme rhetoric was dismissed by many Ethiopians and foreign observers as electioneering excesses of the kind that occur in most mature democratic systems. (I was in Addis Ababa in early May and heard concern from serious people about unrealistic promises, as well as the pernicious effect of Negede Gobeze's book and the radical behavior of Lidetu Ayalew.) The government was alerted to the extent of urban dissatisfaction. The remarkably peaceful conditions under which voting proceeded and the huge turnout are a tribute to the political seriousness and maturity of the overwhelming majority of the Ethiopian population, but did not necessarily indicate political alienation throughout the rest of the country.)
If the government unwisely let some election results be announced prematurely, the opposition (particularly CUD) equally unwisely rushed to announce that it had been the victim of fraud almost before voting was finished. Observers nevertheless pronounced the voting process fair and orderly. Was there government-instigated fraud on a massive scale? We have only the allegations of the opposition, no other proof. Complaints which could be taken seriously (made both by the government and opposition) resulted in repeat elections in some constituencies which met observers' approval. Fraud allegations nevertheless continued and intensified, centered on the performance of the National Electoral Board.
Early opposition allegations of fraud brought demonstrations in the capital in June which resulted in destruction of property, looting and attacks on police. Police and security forces responded quickly and killings occurred which shocked everybody. Violence ceased. Opposition leaders insisted that they had called only for peaceful demonstrations. (The claim has become hypocritical in light of opposition calls for demonstrations and strikes in October which, given the experience in June, had to entail the risk of provoking large-scale violence and, in turn, stern countermeasures by the government.) Opposition claims of massive fraud and cover-up by the NEB persisted and became journalistic conventional wisdom. Meanwhile the government gave evidence that Ana Gomes, head of the EU electoral observer mission had favored the opposition from the beginning.
After the government announced results which gave it a majority in parliament but recognized significant gains for opposition groups, opposition leaders wavered in deciding whether to take seats. Some opposition leaders went through the motions of consultation with constituents. UEDF moved toward a decision to take parliamentary seats against the objections of some of its members and defection of a major component of its coalition. As the emotional temperature of the situation rose during October, CUD showed little concern about violence and encouraged planning for demonstrations, strikes and other forms of ostensible passive resistance. While the aim of some opposition elements may have been to alarm the EPRDF into negotiations for a "government of national unity", this objective, if it was a ever serious possibility, faded into the background. It is not a normal result of close outcomes of democratic elections.
Meanwhile CUD leaders had flown to the United States and campaigned among diaspora elements who have been chronically critical of EPRDF rule. Diaspora funds were collected to support CUD Ex-Derg and Amhara-Centrist groups, of which there are many in the US, have been actively propagandizing for CUD. Declarations made by Mesfin Wolde Mariam and Hailu Shawel in diaspora meetings in Washington justified violence as a means of forcing the EPRDF government to surrender power. Talk of a "Rose Revolution" of the type which occurred in Georgia in 2003 and later in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan became current among diaspora activists.
Did CUD leaders enter the May elections with the intention of taking the seats they might win? Or did they plan from the beginning to return to rejectionism and provoke violence? Was the aim of some of them, following Negede Gobeze's urging, to raise the tactic of rejectionism to a higher level of political sophistication--consciously using allegations of fraud to foment disorder that would force EPRDF leadership to flee? If this was the hope or intention of some, it was a miscalculation. Instead the disorders of late October and early November provoked another violent response from the government and led to incarceration of CUD leaders. EPRDF positions hardened.
There are constructive tendencies evident. 407 of 547 members elected to parliament took their seats when it met. These included most UEDF members elected, but only 6 from CUD. Minor parties have been unsure and no doubt under pressure from both EPRDF and CUD. Whether parliament has yet engaged in any serious business is doubtful. Most serious is CUD's refusal to take responsibility for governing Addis Ababa--which it clearly won. This has forced the EPRDF to appoint a makeshift administration for a strife-torn capital The country-wide general strike which CUD called fizzled with the arrest of CUD leaders. Meanwhile splits and shifts among members of both coalitions are evident. There is still too little information available to gauge the extent of dissatisfaction in major regional centers, though in most of them EPRDF appears to have consolidated effective control.
What is to be Done?
An internationally recognized government which maintains violence has been consciously perpetrated against it with the aim of effecting a coup d'etat should be respected. Its 14-year record of responsible leadership should be taken into account. At the same time, if CUD leaders are to be brought to trial, the government must provide concrete evidence of illegal actions by CUD leaders. Trials must meet acceptable international standards. The government also has an obligation to provide proof of tendentious actions by the EU or other observer missions or other groups--including efforts by diaspora elements--to aid and abet nefarious opposition purposes.
Efforts are under way by the international community to achieve amelioration of the situation in all respects. It is not too late to return to multi-party politics and possibly early future elections, but these must entail a commitment by parties which participate that their candidates will take office if elected.
EPRDF-led Ethiopia has been the only comparatively stable country in the Horn of Africa and the only country with untroubled relations with the United States, Canada and major countries of Europe. Its record for cooperation in the fight against terrorism and in serving other international purposes is excellent. It has continually cooperated in efforts to improve the situation in Somalia, unsuccessful as they have been.
Eritrea remains a threat. Isaias might be tempted to generate a border fracas and blame it on Ethiopia. His international reputation is in a shambles and he must know his army is in doubtful condition. The most recent information is that almost 10,000 young Eritreans have crossed into Ethiopia already this year to avoid military service. Nevertheless, the fact remains that Ethiopia has been unfairly dealt with by the UN-appointed border commission.
There will be pressures for release of incarcerated opposition leaders and followers. Conditions for their release should be negotiated, but the EPRDF will not easily abandon the judicial approach it has already embarked upon.
The situation calls for carefully considered action and creativity on the part of everyone, Ethiopians and friends of Ethiopia.If Ethiopia cannot be steered back onto a stable course, can much be done for most of the rest of Africa? The Economist boldly poses these questions this week but provides no answers. Order is being reimposed in the country. Meles and his colleagues will no doubt continue to keep the army and security forces on the alert. Force along cannot, however, be the permanent answer.
Washington, Virginia
14 November 2005
Comments on the Ethiopian Crisis
Christopher Clapham
University of Cambridge
Centre of African Studies
http://www.african.cam.ac.uk/people/registry/subjectlist/clapham.html
7 November 2005
The Government
The place to start trying to understand any political crisis is always with the government in power. Oppositions merely fill the gaps left by the incumbent regime. The regime itself explains why those gaps are there. In the case of the EPRDF government led by Meles Zenawi, these gaps are glaring.
· Simple time. The Meles government has now been in power for over fourteen years. By the standards of democratic government, anywhere in the world – as opposed to the standards of African dictatorships – this is a very long time. Very few elected leaders last so long: Charles de Gaulle and Margaret Thatcher, the two most dominant European leaders of recent decades, each lasted eleven years. In a newly democratic Africa, Meles’ tenure is now exceeded or equalled by a very small number of very doubtfully democratic leaders, such as Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Museveni of Uganda, al-Beshir of Sudan, and (of course) Isaias of Eritrea. People get tired of leaders, and after fourteen years, any credit that they may once have gained from ousting their predecessors has long been lost. Regular change in leadership is both a consequence of, and a requirement for, democratic governance, and Ethiopia is no exception.
· The extreme narrowness of the regime’s domestic base. The EPRDF has never been able to rid itself of the sense that this is essentially a Tigray government. Though it has selected ministers from a wide range of nationalities, the core of the regime has always lain in the TPLF that created it. Tigray, with some 10% of the population, provides much too narrow a base from which to govern Ethiopia, and once Ethiopians gained the chance to choose their own government, it is only to be expected that they should vote for parties that more evidently represent their own communities.
· The failure to create effective political institutions. The EPRDF, at least outside Tigray, has never been able, or indeed has never been allowed, to develop into an effective political organisation whose regional leadership could exercise any autonomous authority, or represent the communities that they governed. The extraordinarily rapid turnover of leaders in virtually all of the PDOs, orchestrated from the centre, has reflected their feebleness. Many of these leaders had no local base anyhow, while any who sought to create one were removed in case they presented any threat to the leadership of the regime. Once genuine elections came, in which the ruling party needed an effective grassroots organisation to muster support, that organisation did not exist.
· By introducing ethnic federalism, but at the same time retaining tight central control over regional government, the EPRDF found itself caught between two stools. On the one hand, Ethiopian nationalists (by no means restricted to Amharas) were deeply concerned at what looked like an attempt to replicate the failed nationality policies of the USSR, and was often regarded as a divide-and-rule policy to the advantage of Tigray; on the other, representatives of historically disadvantaged nationalities (notably the Oromo) felt that the EPRDF had promised a level of autonomy that it had then totally failed to deliver.
· The EPRDF, indeed, has never sought to operate as an open and democratic organisation. One striking indicator of this has been the virtual invisibility of its leader. Meles Zenawi’s behaviour recalls the era when emperors lived in ritual seclusion: he is virtually never seen, or engages in any public way with other Ethiopians – in striking contrast to his accessibility to important foreigners, and his ability to sparkle on an international stage. While Haile-Selassie was constantly visible ands travelled widely round the country, and even Mengistu Hailemariam appeared in public on major occasions, Meles has remained immured in the EPRDF headquarters in Arat Kilo.
· The government’s style of decision-making has been equally opaque. It has retained all the instincts of a Marxist-Leninist regime, in which any genuine discussion of policy has been restricted to a tiny Politburo. The clearest example is the TPLF split in mid-2001, when issues of critical national importance were fought out within the party Central Committee, without the slightest reference to other Ethiopians.
· The TPLF split itself gravely weakened the government; even though Meles eventually came out on top, even his base in Tigray was deeply threatened; it also has repercussions on other parts of the country, notably because TPLF leaders such as Bitaw Belay who had been responsible for building up the PDOs sided with the opposition to Meles.
· Though the economy has certainly done better than under Mengistu (which would not be difficult), major weaknesses remained, many of which could be ascribed to the underlying Marxist ideology of the regime. The artificial distinction between ‘productive’ and ‘non-productive’ investment inhibited investment in key areas such as housing; the insistence of ‘agriculture-led industrialisation’ led to the neglect of investment opportunities in towns; and the government’s attitude to foreign direct investment remained deeply grudging, reflected in the fact that Ethiopia retains one of the longest periods in Africa for establishing a business. Rigid Marxist ideology prevented any policy debate over the privatisation of land. The TPLF’s own large group of quasi-public enterprises has aroused understandable suspicions of corruption, and undermines its proclaimed conversion to economic liberalism.
· For several years, it has been clear that urban dwellers have been deeply alienated from the regime. Despite development in Addis Ababa, and a small number of towns that have benefited from the new political order (notably Mekelle, but also Bahr Dar and Awassa), most Ethiopian towns remain stagnant backwaters, and government policy has ignored them. Most rural areas, so far as I can judge, have been passive towards the government at best, resentful at worst.
· The government’s attitude towards dissent has often been brutal and alienating, except where the need to placate donor communities has induced restraint. The Awaasa massacre of May 2002, when government forces opened fire with heavy machine guns on people peacefully demonstrating against a proposed change (pushed through without any consultation) in the status of the municipality of Awaasa (and in no way a threat to the regime) provides a particularly crude example. There was no apology or investigation, and local EPRDF officials who failed to support the government’s action were dismissed.
In short, the EPRDF government has now reached a state at which it is almost impossible to imagine it winning any remotely fair election against any reasonably plausible and effective opposition. It has been able to retain a semblance of authority, only because of that deference that Ethiopians customarily display towards people with power, backed by a threat of force. Over three years ago, in July 2002, I reached the conclusion that the government was highly vulnerable, especially to urban dissent. That vulnerability has now been revealed.
The Opposition
Organising public opposition towards those in authority has always been deeply antithetical to Ethiopian conceptions of governance. People who opposed the government for whatever reason have had no options beyond passive obedience, covert subversion under a guise of acceptance, or outright revolt. At no time prior to 1991 had any legitimate opposition been permitted in Ethiopia, and even though the EPRDF government was obliged to accept formal opposition as a result of its need for external support and finance, it has never regarded any opposition movement as legitimate, or as having any right to oust it from power by peaceful electoral means. At the same time, the manifest ‘gaps’ in the government’s capacity to gain the support of the population have produced obvious openings for opposition movements, if these were able to operate. The result has been an opposition with a number of distinctive characteristics.
· The leadership of the opposition has been heavily intellectual and urban-based, since these have been the only group within the country capable of appreciating the hitherto non-existent opportunities that were now open, and with sufficient external contacts to help protect them against government repression. Academics have been well to the fore, but also businessmen, medical doctors and other professionals. There was virtually no other group from which peaceful opposition (as opposed to violent revolt) could be drawn. This very restricted leadership has evidently misled the government into supposing that the opposition would have equally restricted support.
· There were however very important issues which this leadership could articulate, deriving from the weaknesses of the government, and extending well beyond its own group. First and most important were those deriving from ‘nationality’, including both an appeal to a residual but significant sense of Ethiopian nationalism (most obviously among Amharas, but extending to other groups such as Gurages, and to urban dwellers as a whole), and an appeal to those specific nationalities that had historically been alienated from the Ethiopian state, and who had felt at first encouraged, but later betrayed, by the EPRDF’s failure to deliver on its promises. There is a parallel here with the enthusiasm that initially greeted the 1974 revolution, and the subsequent loss of confidence in the Derg. It is correspondingly unsurprising that two main opposition parties, the CUD and the UEDF, should have developed to tap into each of these sources of support.
· There were other sources of support, including the economic liberalism of the CUD, in opposition to the persisting Marxist attitudes of the EPRDF regime, and the ability of each of the two major parties to recruit local authority figures in order to gain support in particular areas. I have detected no explicit attempt to mobilise religion as a source of political support (though a ‘nationalist’ party like CUD must inevitably be associated in some degree with Christianity and especially the Orthodox church).
· I have been entirely unimpressed by attempts to demonise the opposition as Amhara chauvinists, covert Derg supporters, secessionists, Moslem fundamentalists, or whatever. Indeed, the contrast between the present opposition and the TPLF in 1991 is startling: both Ethiopians and outsiders had every reason to be worried about a government of Marxist guerrillas, led by a man whose role model appeared to be Enver Hozha’s Albania; the leadership of the present opposition, on the other hand, are well-known, highly educated, Western-oriented sophisticates. Indeed, both CUD and UEDF leaderships are as liberal as any Ethiopian politician can plausibly be expected to be. Inevitably, they reflect currents in Ethiopian society – that is what political parties are for. One such current is Ethiopian nationalism, which was represented in an extreme and brutal form by the Derg, and which is understandably strongest among Amharas, but which has an entirely legitimate constituency in the country as a whole. On the other side, there is likewise a legitimate constituency for ethnic and regional identities that seek a significant measure of self-government, which indeed have been heavily encouraged, but also disappointed, by the EPRDF. Somehow or other, these two divergent streams in current Ethiopian political consciousness have to be reconciled, and this will undoubtedly be a difficult task. It is however a task that cannot now be achieved by the EPRDF, and for which by far the best option lies in democratic political parties whose leaders are drawn from much the same social strata, and who seek both to retain the support of their constituencies, and to maintain an effective central government which they all need. The current CUD and UEDF, whose leaders know one another well, and which have developed side-by-side in opposition to both the Derg and the EPRDF, provide as good an opportunity of achieving the necessary historic compromise, as Ethiopia can plausibly expect.
· Inevitably, the task of developing effective and legitimate opposition, within a political culture that has never previously accepted it, and against a government prone to resort to violence, is an extremely difficult one. Inexperienced opposition leaders have to find some way of retaining and expressing the support of their constituencies, while at the same time avoiding a breakdown of public order, in the teeth of harassment and government manipulation, and in conditions of great personal danger. It would be a miracle were they to get it right every time.
The Elections
The May 2005 elections in Ethiopia have taken on the characteristics of ‘founding elections’, such as those of 1994 in South Africa, or of the 1950s or early 1960s in most of the rest of the continent. They marked the first occasion in the country’s history when the mass of the electorate felt that they had the opportunity to express their own views on their country’s future, and were able to exercise it. Neither the no-party elections to the Chamber of Deputies under Haile-Selassie, nor the one-party elections to the National Shengo under the Derg, provided any such opportunity, while the two earlier elections under the FDRE were multi-party only in name. Such founding elections are historic occasions, and establish enduring political patterns and claims to leadership. Some of the salient points seem to me to be:
· On the whole, the elections were conducted with a level of fairness and openness completely unprecedented in Ethiopian history. In most areas of the country, parties were able to present candidates and campaign, and people were able to vote, with a degree of freedom hitherto unknown. There were obviously exceptions: it is unlikely that any significant opposition was permitted in Tigray, where the governing faction of the TPLF that won the intra-party struggle in 2002 is intensely aware of the need to control its base, or in areas such as western Welega where support for the OLF is strongest. The Somali region, as always, is a law (or lack of law) to itself. But generally, these were real elections.
· This level of openness can only have been permitted by the government, firstly because it was under strong pressure from donors, and secondly because it was supremely confident that it could not lose. There were nonetheless some worrying signs, even before the elections took place. One of these was the expulsion of Dr. Siegfried Pausewang of the Christian Michelsen Institute in Bergen, a highly experienced observer who had co-authored a report on the 2000 elections.
· There is unanimous agreement on the calm, determination and responsibility of voters throughout Ethiopia, and the patience and orderliness with which they waited and cast their votes. As has happened in many other parts of Africa, the voters themselves refuted any claim that ordinary Ethiopians were not ‘ready’ for democracy, or were incapable of understanding the issues at stake. This determination, sharply at odds with the government-orchestrated expressions of opinion familiar in Ethiopia alike under the imperial, Derg and EPRDF regimes, can be seen in retrospect as presaging bad news for the government. People do not behave in that way in order merely to do what the government (or anyone else) expects them to do. They do so in order to express what they themselves want. Given the history of manipulated expressions of opinion in Ethiopia, any such determination was likely to amount to an assertion of independence from, and opposition to, the incumbent regime.
· The official results of the elections are both complex in themselves, and deeply affected by fraud. We simply do not know what they would have been, had they been both fairly conducted (which was generally the case) and accurately reported (which was not). Nonetheless, some very important conclusions can be reached. First, the EPRDF has completely lost public support in the cities which – in Ethiopia as throughout Africa – are the bellwethers of political opinion. Equally striking, that support has gone overwhelmingly to the CUD: for this to gain every single constituency in Addis Ababa, in both the parliamentary and municipal elections, is a quite extraordinary achievement, and – given the range of nationalities and settlement patterns in the city – indicates support among all urban population groups. It has also gained some regional support outside its Amhara and Gurage heartlands, partly no doubt due to alliances with locally respected politicians. The UEDF also has a significant constituency, especially in regions such as Kambatta and western Shoa that reflect its leadership. On the other hand, some of the constituencies declared for the EPRDF defy any plausible assessment of public opinion in the areas concerned: that it should have won about half of the seats both in Sidama and in western Welega, for instance, is entirely incredible. In Sidama, as a result of the May 2002 massacre, and in western Welega, as the heartland of OLF support, hostility to the regime runs very deep, and the declared results can only be the result either of heavy-handed government pressure before and during the vote, or else of fraud after it.
· The evidence of fraud and intimidation, especially after the debacle suffered by the EPRDF became apparent with the Addis Ababa results, is so overwhelming that it cannot plausibly be denied. The EU observer mission, the Ethiopian Human Rights Council, and Donald Levine in his correspondence with Ethiopian diplomats in the United States, have convincingly demonstrated that significant rigging took place. The announcement of the number of seats won by each party by the government, before any such figures had emerged from the Election Board, is likewise telling. Nor do the re-run elections – held after the rebuff to the government had become apparent, when government resources could be concentrated on a small number of constituencies, and after any necessary pressure had been brought on the Election Board – demonstrate otherwise. We cannot know what the results would have been, had the elections and count been fairly conducted, and it is always possible that the EPRDF would have won them; but the charge that the elections were stolen is eminently plausible.
The Aftermath
The aftermath of the elections left Ethiopia in an entirely unprecedented situation, for which the peculiarities of Ethiopian political culture provided no readily acceptable outcome. Ethiopian governance has historically been based on a willingness to obey any ruler who was able to exercise effective power. In the words of the Tigrayan proverb: ‘the sun that comes up tomorrow will be our sun; the government that rules tomorrow will be our government’. It has had no place for compromise or power-sharing, except in so far as these could be disguised behind a facade of respect for the ruling power. When power has changed hands, as happened most recently in 1991, the old government has lost ‘the mandate of heaven’, and people have started to obey a new government that evidently possessed the capacity to rule, with only a short hiatus of potential anarchy between the two. A government divided between rival powers has never been on offer. After the scale of the EPRDF’s loss of support became apparent, especially in the cities, all Ethiopian politicians were left in a situation of extreme uncertainty and potential personal danger, government and opposition alike. While the personal dangers were most acute for the opposition, the TPLF likewise could not assume that it would be able to cede or share power peacefully, least of all if its own actions in government (including the danger of revelations of corruption) were to be subject to public scrutiny. The resulting confrontation may well have been inevitable. All the same, a few points are worth noting:
· The EPRDF has shown no inclination at all to accept any compromise or power-sharing solution, even though this has been proposed by the opposition. It is certainly difficult to see how this could have been made to work, but a willingness to entertain the idea would at least have helped to tide over the difficult period after the elections, and send a reassuring signal to the outside world.
· It is difficult to exaggerate the enormous amount of damage that has been done to the EPRDF government by Bereket Simon, the former Minister of Information and now information adviser to the Prime Minister, who has become the principal spokesman for the government. His neurotic and consistently inflammatory pronouncements, extending even to threats of an equivalent to the Rwanda genocide, have conveyed a very clear impression, both to the opposition and to the outside world, that the EPRDF is entirely unwilling to engage in any normal or reasonable political process. While Meles Zenawi has remained extraordinarily silent, the impression inevitably develops that Bereket expresses views which he shares, but which he is still wise enough not to be credited with himself.
· The opposition is caught in a bind. On the one hand, it cannot simply accept election results that it has every reason to believe or fraudulent, and it must do what it can to meet the expectations or demands of supporters who are irretrievably alienated from the regime. On the other hand, it has no interest in escalating violence, which would only play into the hands of a government that possesses a monopoly of organised force and has not the slightest hesitation to use it. The resort to peaceful demonstrations and boycotts is an obvious compromise for it to follow, even though there is an evident danger that these may get out of hand, and result in looting or violence.
· The government, on the other hand, has an interest in presenting opposition as violent, criminal or treasonable, and fomenting the conditions under which it will be able to suppress it by force. This indeed appears to be precisely the tactic that it has followed. Its response to demonstrations has been massively disproportionate, and while this may well reflect lack of experience in peaceful crowd control, it also suits at least the short-term interests of the regime.
· In the longer (or even not so long) term, however, the government response carries intense dangers, both to itself and to Ethiopia. It risks an escalating loss of control, paralleling the developments of 1974; it alienates the government’s international supporters, on which it depends both for aid and for pressure to maintain the peace with Eritrea; and it carries an extreme risk that the Isaias regime will take the opportunity to re-launch the border war, under conditions which it regards as the most favourable that it can expect. The parallel here is with the Siyad Barre regime in 1977. Equally, while until recently I took the view that Ethiopia had every interest in maintaining peace on the northern frontier, and that any escalation could only come from the Eritrean government, there is now at least a plausible chance that the EPRDF regime might foment war as a means of re-establishing its own domestic credibility.
Possible Outcomes
It now seems to me beyond any plausible likelihood that the EPRDF government can re-establish its position as an acceptable public authority – entirely regardless of whether that authority be democratic or not. On the contrary, it has now reached the point, reached by the imperial and Derg regimes before it, at which its authority has withered away, and cannot be recovered. It has lost ‘the mandate of heaven’, and in these circumstances, only three possible outcomes remain:
· The EPRDF government might leave power peacefully. The is obviously the best outcome, even though there is absolutely nothing to indicate that the government would be prepared to accept it. On the other hand, there was no indication that the Mengistu regime would make a rapid and virtually uncontested transfer of power possible, until Mengistu himself fled. Now that Meles Zenawi has effectively burnt any bridges that he might have opened with the opposition, it is clearly in the broader interests both of Ethiopia and of the international community that he should be persuaded to go.
· The government might leave power violently. There is a very strong possibility that continuing and escalating conflict in the towns might either spread to the countryside – if not in the form of organised guerrilla warfare, which seems to me unlikely, then at any rate by expelling government representatives and establishing some temporary form of local autonomy – or be reflected in the armed forces’ unwillingness to persist with further repression. Indeed, some kind of forcible showdown seems to me to be the most likely outcome, however horrifying it might be.
· The government might succeed in retaining its hold on power, in the process converting itself into an overtly repressive regime on the lines of Mugabe’s Zimbabwe or Isaias’ Eritrea. The question is not whether it has the willingness to do this, which it has already demonstrated, but whether it has the capacity. My guess would be No: Ethiopia is a vastly more diverse and complex society than Eritrea, and lacks the unifying nationalism that is still able to provide Isaias with a residual element of public support; nor do Ethiopians possess that extraordinary passivity that characterises at least the Shona peoples of Zimbabwe. Ethiopia is now in my view too diverse and developed, and has too many potential alternative centres of power, to make the reimposition of a central dictatorship possible. The attempt to do so would be counterproductive, whether immediately at the centre or over a longer period in the government’s progressive failure to control the rest of the country, and would only eventually result in its overthrow by progressively more violent means.
In short, the transition in Ethiopia is already under way, and the concern both of Ethiopians and of the international community should be to do whatever they can to make it as quick and as peaceful as possible.
C.S.C.
7 November 2005
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